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Zero-Sum Judicial Elections:  
Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality Through 
Recusal Reform 
While campaigning for a seat on the bench, Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Justice Louis Butler spoke at a fundraiser for a gay-rights 
group, gaining the group’s endorsement, raising over $21,000 for 
the group, and earning a favorable editorial in an LGBT 
publication.1 Once Butler was in office, a minister brought a 
defamation suit against the gay-rights group, and Butler cast the 
deciding vote that dismissed the case, requiring the minister’s 
attorney to pay $87,000 in court costs and fees.2 Denying a motion 
requesting the justice’s recusal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held 
that Butler subjectively determined that he could be impartial and 
thus satisfied the standard for hearing the case.3 
States that choose to elect their judges face a constitutional 
predicament. Judicial elections create a zero-sum game between free 
speech and due process.4 In order for there to be an informed 
electorate, judicial candidates must notify the public about their 
policies and opinions. Additionally, the judicial candidate has a First 
Amendment right to declare his positions prior to the election. 
Without judicial free speech, the electorate cannot accurately choose 
the best candidate, and the purpose of the election is thwarted. But 
in stating their opinions, judicial candidates risk losing the 
appearance of impartiality and threaten due process rights. 
Regardless of the correctness of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
allowing Justice Butler to hear the case unquestionably threatened 
the appearance of impartiality. No matter how fair and impartial they 
actually are, elected judges who criticize and openly oppose a 
 
 1. Scott Bauer, Wisconsin Supreme Court: Appeal Asserts Justice Had Conflict of 
Interest, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 1, 2008, at B3; David Ziemer, Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Rules Butler Had No Duty to Recuse Self From Case, WIS. L.J., Aug. 4, 2008, available 
at http://www.wislawjournal.com/article.cfm?recid=70949. 
 2. Bauer, supra note 1, at B3. The justice had also accepted four donations from 
leaders of the gay-rights group involved in the lawsuit. Id. 
 3. Storms v. Action Wis. Inc., 754 N.W.2d 480, 489 (Wis. 2008). 
 4. A zero-sum game is a conflict where one party’s gain must necessarily result in 
another party’s loss, the net result always equaling zero. 
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litigant’s policy position in their campaign lose their ability to appear 
fair and neutral when such a case is brought before the bench.5 
In these zero-sum judicial elections, states traditionally side with 
due process rights, circumventing threats to impartiality through 
judicial campaign speech restrictions. For example, a “pledge or 
promise clause” in a state’s code of judicial conduct prohibits judicial 
candidates from promising to rule a certain way on an issue if they 
are elected. These states feel that such prohibitions limit the damage 
to the appearance of impartiality that unlimited speech would cause. 
But in this zero-sum game, with each prohibition that states pass, the 
electorate becomes less informed about each candidate’s positions 
and the candidate’s First Amendment rights are hindered. 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
quandary between the due process clause and the First Amendment 
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.6 The Court held that one 
of Minnesota’s prohibitions on judicial speech, an “announce 
clause,” violated the First Amendment.7 Only nine states employed 
announce clauses, which amorphously stated that judicial candidates 
could not announce their positions on legal issues. 
While the Supreme Court specifically limited the scope of its 
holding to these announce clauses, lower courts have accepted White 
as a watershed case for striking down most, if not all, of the judicial 
restrictions on free speech. Many critics say that such interpretation 
poses a threat to judicial independence. Among these critics is former 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the swing vote in the 5–4 White 
decision, who has expressed regret over the lower courts’ 
interpretation of White since leaving the bench.8 At a judicial 
conference, Justice O’Connor told the audience that she does not 
revisit many of her rulings but was having second thoughts about 
White because it “produced a lot of very disturbing trends in state 
election of judges.”9 Now, seven years after White, such trends have 
 
 5. See Bauer, supra note 1, at B3 (“‘I think the facts speak for themselves,’ [the losing 
party] said Monday. ‘How can I feel it was impartial in my case when he’s got these ties to the 
opposing party?’”). 
 6. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 7. Id. at 768, 788.  
 8. See, e.g., Matthew Hirsch, The Case That Still Nags at Sandra Day, THE RECORDER, 
Nov. 7, 2006 (quoting Justice O’Connor as saying, “that White case, I confess, does give me 
pause” and “[s]ometimes we just don’t get it right”).  
 9. Linda P. Campbell, Sitting Ducks on the Judicial Bench, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, 
Nov. 24, 2006, at 8B. Justice O’Connor has since defined these trends as the increasing role of 
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state supreme courts and judicial ethics committees throughout the 
country still struggling to integrate the White decision and its 
conflicting progeny. States are uncertain how speech restrictions will 
be treated by the courts and are concerned about how to limit the 
negative effects of unrestrained judicial election speech while still 
allowing candidates to speak their minds and inform the public of 
their positions. 
This Comment offers suggestions for recusal reform that will 
appropriately balance judicial candidates’ free speech rights against 
the need for an impartial judiciary. As a means of alleviating the ills 
of judicial elections, recusal reform is more efficient and more clearly 
constitutional than campaign speech restrictions. Part I summarizes 
the history of judicial elections and outlines the arguments for and 
against restricting judicial election speech. Part II examines how the 
Supreme Court’s White decision has shaped the debate and describes 
the reaction of lower federal courts who have treated the case as a 
watershed rather than a limited holding. Based on this trend, it 
appears that all judicial speech restrictions are doomed for failure and 
states are thus uncertain how to ensure judicial impartiality. Part III 
declares that recusal reform offers an effective, constitutional means 
of solving the dilemma caused by zero-sum judicial elections. By 
adopting a new model recusal provision, assigning recusal motions to 
other judges, and lessening the financial burden of litigants, states 
can stop the threat that judicial elections pose to the judiciary’s 
impartiality without restricting judicial speech. Part IV offers a brief 
conclusion. 
I. ZERO-SUM JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
Judicial elections create a zero-sum game between contradictory 
forces: (1) the judicial candidate’s right to free speech and the need 
for informed electorates, and (2) the due process rights of litigants 
and the impartiality of the judicial branch. Policies in favor of one 
will be to the detriment of the other. This section examines these 
forces and the arguments for and against limiting speech in such 
elections. 
 
money and interest groups in judicial elections and the subsequent decrease in public opinion 
of the judiciary. See infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
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A. Judicial Elections in Perspective 
In the eighteenth century, the framers of federal and state 
constitutions firmly believed in creating a bench sanitized from the 
democratic whims of the people, and early methods of judicial 
selection emphasized this principle. Perhaps because they viewed 
British judges as mere puppets of the King,10 the Framers of the 
United States Constitution made judicial independence the bedrock 
principle of Article III.11 Alexander Hamilton explained the Framers’ 
design of the judicial branch by writing: “The complete 
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a 
limited constitution. . . . If the power of [selecting judges was 
committed] to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the 
special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult 
popularity.”12 Hamilton explained that the judiciary should exhibit 
an “inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the 
[C]onstitution,” not to the impulses or urges of political fads.13 The 
Founders further believed that the states should mirror this 
commitment to an independent judiciary,14 and the earliest states 
emulated their federal counterpart when designing state judicial 
selection.15 
 
 10. The Declaration of Independence complained that King George III “made Judges 
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of 
their salaries.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776). 
 11. See U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man 
Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 301, 306 (2003) (“The protection of judicial independence is a foundational 
principle—perhaps the foundational principle—of Article III.”). For example, through lifetime 
appointments and guaranteed salaries, the Constitution seeks to insulate federal judges from 
presidential or legislative reaction to unpopular rulings. Id. 
 12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 292, 298 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 13. Id. at 297. Indeed, Hamilton wrote that lifetime appointments were “one of the 
most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government . . . [an] excellent 
barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.” Id. at 291. 
Hamilton was hardly alone in his feelings for judicial independence. At the convention in 
Philadelphia in 1787, the Founders established life tenure for judges and a protected judicial 
salary with little debate. Dimino, supra note 11, at 307. While Anti-Federalists opposed such 
judicial independence (feeling the judicial branch should be subject to Congress), both groups 
agreed that electing judges was “dangerously unwise.” Id. at 308. 
 14. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 312 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[The] Constitution  
. . . is equally applicable to most, if not all the state governments.”). 
 15. CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE 
RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 2–3 (1997). Of the original thirteen colonies, 
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By the early nineteenth century, however, many states did not 
view the appointment method for selecting judges as a means to 
judicial independence, but rather as an aristocratic mistrust of the 
people. Jacksonian democrats emphasized popular sovereignty, the 
common man’s right to elect his government, and the corruptibility 
of unchecked government officials.16 As political power shifted more 
directly into the hands of the people, many states began to disfavor 
the concept of an elite and privileged bench.17 By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, several states enacted a system to directly elect 
their judges, and every new state admitted to the Union between 
1846 and 1912 selected its judges through elections.18 
The populist practices of Jacksonian democrats quickly met 
challenges in the face of partisan politics.19 By the early twentieth 
century, strong political parties, exemplified by powerful political 
machines such as Tammany Hall, effectively appointed state judges 
through their iron grip on local electorates. As a result, the quality of 
the judiciary waned, and a progressive movement to depoliticize 
state judicial elections began.20 However, rather than return to the 
appointment process that states had used in the past, reformers 
schizophrenically attempted both to preserve judicial elections and to 
remove divisive politics from the process.21 
For better or worse, judicial elections are ingrained in our 
system. Today, thirty-nine states still elect judges, and as many as 
eighty-nine percent of all state and local judges must win or retain 
their seats through elections.22 In the last two decades, elections have 
 
eight state legislatures appointed their judges while the remaining five were selected by the 
governor and a specially-appointed council. Id. at 3.  
 16. PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE 
QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (1980). 
 17. Id.; see also Robert C. Berness, Norms of Judicial Behavior: Understanding 
Restrictions on Judicial Candidate Speech in the Age of Attack Politics, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1027, 1029–30 (Summer 2001). 
 18. DUBOIS, supra note 16, at 3. 
 19. MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY—SELECTION, 
COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 4, 7 (1987). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. States implemented several progressive reforms to avoid outside political 
influence on judicial candidates, including the removal of party labels from the ballot, the 
elimination of partisan nominating conventions, and the creation of direct primaries. Id. 
 22. See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and 
General Jurisdiction Courts (2007), http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Judicial%20Selection 
%20Charts.pdf; Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1077 (2007). These states vary widely between initial appointments, retention elections, and 
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become “nastier, noisier, and costlier” than ever.23 Attack ads, 
influential interest group donations, and unprecedented spending are 
now commonplace. In other words, judicial elections are politics as 
usual.24 
B. The Cases For and Against Speech Restrictions 
Historically, states have attempted to protect impartiality by 
restricting a judicial candidate’s speech. The progressive movement 
to depoliticize judicial elections included an attempt by the American 
Bar Association to regulate the political activities of judges. In 1924, 
the ABA drafted and adopted the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and 
forty-three states subsequently adopted similar versions.25 The 
Canons, later named the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, covered a 
broad spectrum of behavior including prohibitions on making 
political speeches, promising certain rulings when on the bench, and 
announcing legal opinions on disputed issues.26 These states clearly 
valued due process and impartiality, but the measures taken to 
reinforce such principles were implemented at the direct expense of 
free speech and accurate elections. The following discussion will 
outline the reasons for and against such judicial speech restrictions. 
1. The case for restricting judicial election speech 
Most of the modern-day arguments for restricting judicial 
election speech center on protecting procedural due process. As the 
Framers emphasized, an independent and impartial judiciary is 
necessary to protect this core doctrine.27 Speech restrictions temper 
the effects that judicial accountability could have on the role of a 
judge and the appearance of impartiality. 
 
contestable elections (both partisan and non-partisan). States further employ different methods 
for their different courts, not to mention different term limits and methods of appointment 
(merit-based or independent). 
 23. Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 149, 150 (1998). 
 24. See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 269 
(2008) (“[J]udicial elections are not going wild; they are going normal.”). 
 25. COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 110. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See supra text accompanying notes 11–13; Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. 
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 
455, 457 (1986) (stating that due process requires independent, impartial judges). 
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a. The majoritarian difficulty. Unfettered judicial campaign 
speech runs contrary to the goal of the judiciary to provide a fair and 
neutral court. There is a “critical difference” between legislators who 
represent the people and judges who serve no constituency.28 While 
voters expect legislators to make certain promises of how they will 
act in office, judges must not be bound to specific rulings or 
outcomes before hearing the evidence in a case. Constitutionalism 
protects individuals’ and minorities’ rights against majoritarian will, 
and judges are often the ones called upon to enforce these rights 
against the majority.29 “When those charged with checking the 
majority are themselves answerable to, and thus influenced by, the 
majority, the question arises how individual and minority protection 
is secured.”30 
b. Appearance of impartiality. Even if judges can ignore the 
electoral consequences of their decisions, “the public’s confidence in 
the judiciary could be undermined simply by the possibility that 
judges would be unable to do so.”31 Parties who bring suit on an 
issue that is contrary to the judge’s expressed views and lose would 
likely question whether their case was heard by a fair and impartial 
judge. Overall, the public would view judges as politicians and not 
neutral arbiters. Conflicting political interests are acceptable for a 
legislature, but such conflict destroys public confidence that judges 
decide each case on its merits. This argument is especially poignant 
for the judiciary, which having neither “purse nor sword,” relies to a 
large degree on the appearance of impartiality for power.32 “The 
 
 28. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 29. Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 
1988 (1988) (“The paramount function of courts is to protect social minorities and individual 
rights. But judges cannot be expected to perform this countermajoritarian function if their 
ability to keep their prestigious, highly sought after positions depends on popular approval of 
their rulings.”). 
 30. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995). 
 31. White, 536 U.S. at 789 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The judiciary on the contrary has 
no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the 
wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have 
neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of 
the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”). 
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legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its 
reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship.”33 
2. The case for allowing free judicial election speech 
Alternatively, critics of judicial campaign speech restrictions 
argue that elections cannot function when voters are ignorant, and 
speech restrictions breach judicial candidates’ free speech rights. 
Despite the legal system’s unrealistic ideals that judges should be 
perfectly neutral, judicial candidates have biases; only unrestricted 
speech allows the electorate to choose the best candidate. 
a. Free speech rights and the marketplace of ideas. Political 
expression, particularly in the context of debate about candidates for 
public office, “is at the core of our First Amendment freedoms.”34 
Judicial candidates have a constitutional right of free speech, and if 
states choose “to tap the energy and legitimizing power of the 
democratic process,” they must allow the candidates their First 
Amendment rights.35 Further, restricting speech places candidates in 
an impossible situation—risking either appearing impartial, or 
appearing evasive and losing to a more outspoken opponent. 
Voters cannot elect the best judges while “under conditions of 
state-imposed voter ignorance.”36 States should trust the electorate 
to sift through judicial candidates’ speech and elect the best 
candidate. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “the best test 
of the truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution.”37 In an open marketplace, voters are the ultimate 
judge of which candidate is the most fair and unbiased. 
b. Crocodiles in calm waters. Other critics mock the principle of a 
dispassionate, neutral judge as mere idealism. Judges are human, 
each with biases and prejudices. Thomas Jefferson’s view that a judge 
 
 33. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989). 
 34. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 2001) (rev’d and 
remanded, 536 U.S. 765); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (characterizing 
“political expression” as standing “‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First 
Amendment freedoms’” (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))); Monitor 
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee [of the First 
Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns 
for political office.”). 
 35. White, 536 U.S. at 788. 
 36. Id. (citation omitted). 
 37. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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should become “a mere machine” in applying the law38 has long 
been discredited. States may not “protect the court as a mystical 
entity” with judges as “anointed priests set apart from the 
community and spared the criticism to which in a democracy other 
public servants are exposed.”39 
A judge’s preexisting beliefs will inevitably influence his 
decisions—“discretion is inherent to judging.”40 Forcing judges to 
hide personal prejudices presents the appearance of calm waters, 
while in reality the waters are crocodile-infested.41 Judicial elections 
should help voters recognize a judge’s biases, or “crocodiles,” before 
it is too late.42 Restricted speech leads to unsuspecting plaintiffs 
appearing before biased judges who were forced to hide their views. 
Alternatively, if a judge’s prejudices are apparent, plaintiffs can 
change their litigation strategy or seek judicial recusal. 
c. Judges as policymakers. Common law creates policy. State 
judges are thus policymakers and should be treated like politicians.43 
The Jacksonian Era created judicial elections not to take the politics 
out of judicial selection, but merely to change the judge’s allegiance 
to the people rather than the legislative or executive branches.44 
Alternatives to popular elections, such as merit-based selection, are 
far from being politically immune themselves and encourage partisan 
 
 38. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776), in 1 PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 503, 505 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950). 
 39. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 292 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also 
Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by 
Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207, 235 (1987) (“The rule does nothing to 
stop the election of prejudiced judges to the bench. On the contrary, the restriction on 
campaign speech requires judicial candidates to hide their prejudices behind a facade of forced 
silence.”). 
 40. Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are 
Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 736 (2002). 
 41. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶ 43) 
(Miss. 2004) (quoting the Malayan proverb, “Don’t think there are no crocodiles because the 
water is calm”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Some research even concludes that elected judges behave like politicians, tailoring 
their decisions in response to the expected reaction of the electorate. See, e.g., Melinda Gann 
Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. 
POL. 1117, 1123 (1987). 
 44. See Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the 
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 217 (1993) 
(“[S]upporters of the elective system tended to believe that influences of some sort were 
inevitable, and that the influence of the whole people was preferable to the influence of smaller 
groups.”). 
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favoritism. States simply prefer popular accountability to judicial 
independence. 
II. WHITE AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The Supreme Court’s White decision weighed in on the debate 
between free speech and impartiality. In the 1990s, federal courts 
produced over a dozen rulings on judicial campaign speech 
restrictions and arrived at various conclusions ranging from blanket 
approvals to the invalidation of specific restrictions.45 In 2002, the 
United States Supreme Court displayed this same spectrum of 
opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, arriving at a 5–4 
decision.46 While the Eighth Circuit had upheld Minnesota’s speech 
restriction because of judicial independence and impartiality, Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion reversed the Eighth Circuit and upheld free 
speech. 
A. Republic Party of Minnesota v. White 
1. The facts: White and the Minnesota announce clause 
Ever since Minnesota attained statehood in 1858, the state has 
selected its judges through popular elections.47 In 1974, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted several provisions of the 1972 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, including an “announce clause.”48 
This clause mandated that a “candidate for a judicial office, including 
an incumbent judge . . . [shall not] announce his or her views on 
disputed legal or political issues.”49 Violating the clause warranted 
disciplinary action, including “removal, censure, civil penalties, and 
suspension without pay” for incumbent judges50 and “disbarment, 
suspension, and probation” for lawyers.51 The issue in Republican 
 
 45. Compare, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 140–43 
(3d Cir. 1991) (upholding state’s announce clause), with ACLU of Fla. v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. 
Supp. 1094, 1096–98 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (invalidating state’s announce clause). 
 46. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 766 (2002). 
 47. Id. at 768. Minnesota began holding non-partisan judicial elections in 1912. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)). 
 50. Id. (citing MINN. R. BD. ON JUD. STANDARDS 11(d) (2002)). 
 51. Id. (citing MINN. R. LAW. PROF. RESP. 15(a) (2002)). 
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Party of Minnesota v. White was whether Minnesota’s announce 
clause violated a judicial candidate’s right to free speech.52 
As part of a 1996 campaign, a judicial candidate, Gregory 
Wersal, openly criticized the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decisions 
regarding “crime, welfare, and abortion.”53 A complaint was filed 
against him with the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility 
Board, claiming Wersal’s criticisms violated the state’s announce 
clause. The Board dismissed the complaint and questioned the 
constitutionality of the clause. Despite this dismissal, Wersal 
withdrew from the election, fearing further ethical complaints against 
him.54 In 1998, Wersal sought an advisory opinion from the Board 
on whether it would enforce the announce clause if he campaigned 
again.55 The Board refused to comment, claiming Wersal did not 
submit a list of specific announcements he planned to make.56 Wersal 
filed suit in federal district court seeking “a declaration that the 
announce clause violate[d] the First Amendment and an injunction 
against its enforcement.”57 The district court upheld the announce 
clause, finding no First Amendment violation.58 On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed.59 The Republican Party of Minnesota joined 
Wersal’s cause and appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
which heard the case in March 2002. 
2. The test: White applies strict scrutiny to judicial campaign speech 
The Court subjected the announce clause to strict scrutiny after 
deciding the clause “prohibits a judicial candidate from stating his 
views on any specific . . . legal question within the province of the 
court for which he is running.”60 “[S]peech about the qualifications 
of candidates for public office” is “at the core of our First 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 768–69. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 769. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 769–70. 
 58. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn. 1999). 
 59. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 60. White, 536 U.S. at 773–75 (2002). The Court went on to reason that the announce 
clause prohibits this expression “except in the context of discussing past decisions” if in 
discussing such decisions the candidate “expresses the view that he is not bound by stare 
decisis.” Id. at 773. 
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Amendment freedoms”61 and thus worthy of the most stringent 
standard of review reserved for fundamental rights. To apply strict 
scrutiny, “respondents have the burden to prove that the announce 
clause is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state 
interest.”62 Many scholars consider the application of strict scrutiny a 
death sentence for whatever restriction the court is analyzing—
scrutiny that is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”63 
3. The holding: White and impartiality 
White examined whether impartiality is a compelling state 
interest. The Eighth Circuit held that two interests were “sufficiently 
compelling to justify the announce clause: preserving the impartiality 
. . . [and] the appearance of the impartiality of the state judiciary.”64 
The first interest “protect[ed] the due process rights of litigants,” 
and the second “preserve[d] public confidence in the judiciary.”65 
Justice Scalia reasoned that impartiality can be interpreted as “the 
lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding” which 
“assures equal application of the law.”66 Justice Scalia held that this 
“party neutrality” definition of impartiality is a compelling state 
interest and essential to due process.67 Even so, Scalia strongly 
rejected the definition of an impartial judge as one who remains 
neutral to the issues involved in a case. All judges hold strong 
opinions about legal issues because of their years practicing law, 
experience that should qualify the judge for service, not discredit 
him.68 The state has no compelling interest in preserving issue 
 
 61. Id. at 774 (quoting Kelly, 247 F.3d at 861, 863). 
 62. Id. at 774–75. 
 63. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972). Contra Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006) (“[S]trict scrutiny is 
far from the inevitably deadly test imagined by the Gunther myth.”). 
 64. White, 536 U.S. at 775 (citing Kelly, 247 F.3d at 867). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 775–76. Justice Scalia also considered impartiality as open-mindedness, or a 
“willing[ness] to consider views that oppose [the judge’s] preconceptions.” Id. at 778. But he 
spent little time analyzing this definition, stating that “we do not believe the Minnesota 
Supreme Court adopted the announce clause for that purpose.” Id. 
 67. Id. at 765−66, 776−78. 
 68. Id. at 777–78 (“The Minnesota Constitution positively forbids the selection to 
courts of general jurisdiction of judges who are impartial in the sense of having no views on the 
law.”). 
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neutrality which “has never been thought a necessary component of 
equal justice.”69 
The majority opinion further held that despite “party neutrality” 
being a compelling state interest, Minnesota’s announce clause was 
not narrowly tailored to meet that interest.70 To be narrowly 
tailored, a prohibition must not “unnecessarily circumscrib[e] 
protected expression.”71 The announce clause first failed this 
definition by focusing on issue neutrality rather than party 
neutrality.72 “[T]he clause . . . [did] not restrict speech for or against 
particular parties, but rather speech for or against particular issues.”73 
As a result, parties arguing such issues, regardless of who they were, 
would be likely to lose.74 Second, the announce clause only limited a 
candidate’s campaign speech, an “infinitesimal” portion of the 
judge’s statements that would create pressure to rule in a certain 
way.75 By limiting such a small portion of a judge’s speech, the 
announce clause was a “woefully underinclusive” means of serving 
impartiality.76 In sum, according to the majority, the benefit that 
voters achieve by being informed of the qualifications of the 
candidates outweighs any concern over judicial impartiality.77 
4. Noteworthy concurrences 
While agreeing with the Court’s majority opinion, Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy each touched on different themes in their 
concurrences. Both concurrences stated that judicial independence 
and the appearance of impartiality are vitally important to the 
 
 69. Id. at 777 (“[I]t is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have 
preconceptions about the law.”). Note how Justice Scalia’s opinion recognizes key arguments 
for and against speech restrictions—the need for judicial independence and the myth of 
perfectly neutral judges. See supra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2.b. 
 70. White, 536 U.S. at 776.  
 71. Id. at 775 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982)). 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 776. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 778–79. A judicial candidate may announce his views “up until the very day 
before he declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until litigation is pending) 
after he is elected. As a means of pursuing the objective of openmindedness that respondents 
now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that 
purpose a challenge to the credulous.” Id. at 779–80. 
 76. Id. at 780. 
 77. See id. at 781–82 (“We have never allowed the government to prohibit candidates 
from communicating relevant information to voters during an election.”). 
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judiciary.78 The Justices also agreed that the goals of the announce 
clause deserve attention, but should be achieved in a more 
compelling and narrowly tailored manner. 
Justice O’Connor particularly emphasized how “judicial elections 
generally” are a threat to judicial independence.79 “[E]ven aside from 
what judicial candidates may say while campaigning, the very practice 
of electing judges undermines [an actual and perceived impartial 
judiciary].”80 She saw electoral pressure and campaign fundraising as 
of particular concern.81 For her, other forms of judicial selection, 
such as the appointment process or merit selection, did not restrict 
speech yet still encouraged an impartial judiciary.82 Despite these 
alternatives, she concluded that Minnesota chose to elect its judges 
and “has voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias.”83 
Justice Kennedy first emphasized that unless one of the 
traditional exceptions applies, “direct restrictions on the content of 
candidate speech are simply beyond the power of government to 
impose.”84 He then implicitly endorsed a marketplace of ideas theory 
for why restrictions should not be practiced: “[D]emocracy and free 
speech are their own correctives.”85 The marketplace works because 
the legal and political communities “and all interested citizens can 
use their own First Amendment freedoms to protest statements 
inconsistent with standards of judicial neutrality and judicial 
excellence.”86 Of particular interest to this Comment, Justice 
Kennedy also included adoption of “recusal standards more rigorous 
than due process requires” as a potential solution to combating the 
ills of judicial elections.87 
 
 78. See id. at 788 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“We of course want judges to be 
impartial, in the sense of being free from any personal stake in the outcome of the cases to 
which they are assigned.”); id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Nothing in the Court’s 
opinion should be read to cast doubt on the vital importance of [maintaining the integrity of 
its judiciary].”). 
 79. Id. at 788 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 789–90. 
 82. See id. at 791–92 . 
 83. Id. at 792 . 
 84. Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Examples of traditionally defined exceptions 
include obscene speech and speech that directly incites violence. Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86. Id. at 795. 
 87. Id. at 794; see infra Part III. 
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B. White as a Watershed 
The White decision alone hardly seems remarkable—it affected 
only one largely outdated restriction, which twenty-five states had 
already repealed.88 If lower courts were to hold White to its explicit 
holding, only nine states would have needed to invalidate their 
announce clauses and judicial elections would not be significantly 
changed.89 Further, Justice Scalia explicitly stated that judicial 
elections do not need to look exactly like legislative elections.90 
However, lower courts have justified striking down or weakening 
numerous judicial speech regulations through a liberal reading of 
White. But viewing White as the beacon of a new era of free speech 
in judicial elections poses grave threats to judicial independence. 
1. Lower courts’ expansion of White 
Perhaps taking cues from the fate of other restrictions subject to 
strict scrutiny,91 lower federal courts have consistently expanded the 
reasoning of White to invalidate other judicial speech restrictions. 
The White case was remanded to the Eighth Circuit where the court 
struck down two provisions that had not been analyzed by the 
Supreme Court.92 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated, based 
on White’s reasoning, several sections of the Georgia Code of 
 
 88. See Schotland, supra note 22, at 1095 n.77 (“[The announce clause] was law in only 
nine states, with about twenty-five others having repealed it after 1990 when the ABA deleted 
it from the Model Code precisely because of concern about its constitutionality.”). 
 89. See id. Justice Scalia’s opinion was explicitly limited to a state’s announce clause. 
Other restrictions, such as the Minnesota pledge or promise clause, were not being challenged 
in the decision, a fact that helped define the parameters of the announce clause. In fact, Justice 
Scalia determined the extent of the announce clause in part by reasoning that because 
Minnesota also had a pledge or promise clause, the announce clause “extends to the 
candidate’s mere statement of his current position, even if he does not bind himself to 
maintain that position after election.” White, 536 U.S. at 770. 
 90. White, 536 U.S. at 783 (“[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment 
requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office.”). 
 91. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 92. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005). The court 
struck down Minnesota’s partisan activities clause (which created nonpartisan elections by 
prohibiting judges from identifying themselves as members of a political party, seeking political 
endorsements, or attending political gatherings) and solicitation clause (which prohibited 
candidates from personally soliciting or accepting campaign contributions). Id. at 745, 766. 
The court held that “a party label is nothing more than shorthand for the views a judicial 
candidate holds.” Id. at 754. Also, the solicitation clause “completely chill[s]” a candidate’s 
speech to potential contributors and supporters while hardly advancing judicial impartiality at 
all. Id. at 763 (quoting Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
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Judicial Conduct93 including a provision which was never challenged 
by the plaintiff and was not the issue being argued at trial or on 
appeal.94 Additionally, federal courts in Alaska,95 Kansas,96 
Kentucky,97 and North Dakota98 have also struck down state judicial 
speech restrictions. 
In 2007, the Fifth Circuit wrote perhaps the broadest 
interpretation of White thus far by applying the analysis to a judge’s 
speech while not campaigning. A Texas state judge held a televised 
news conference in his courtroom where, while wearing his robe, he 
both improperly read a prepared statement displaying his personal 
feelings regarding an unresolved case and openly criticized the 
conduct of a participating attorney and his client.99 Such conduct 
was in violation of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which states 
that a “judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance 
the private interests of the judge or others.”100 Although the judge 
was not involved in any campaign at the time, the Fifth Circuit 
applied White to the judge’s speech. Nonetheless, the press 
conference was interpreted as an “elected official’s speech to his 
constituency,” and consequently, any restriction on the speech 
 
 93. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1325. The court struck down Georgia’s false and misleading 
speech clause which stated that a judicial candidate “shall not use or participate in the use of 
any form of public communication which the candidate knows or reasonably should know is 
false, fraudulent, misleading, [or] deceptive.” GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
7(B)(1)(d). The court held that the provision was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
interest because “it prohibits far more speech than necessary to serve Georgia’s compelling 
interests.” Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319, 1321. There must be “breathing space” for “false 
statements negligently made and true statements that are misleading or deceptive.” Id. at 1319 
(citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982)). 
 94. Roy Schotland, Impacts of White, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 625, 626 (2007). 
 95. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 
1083 (D. Alaska 2005). On appeal, the 9th Circuit held that the district court should have 
declined jurisdiction because it was a “preenforcement challenge” with no “concrete factual 
scenario” to analyze. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 
849 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 96. Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1240 (D. Kan. 2006). On 
appeal, the 10th Circuit reserved judgment until the Kansas Supreme Court answered 
“important and unsettled questions” regarding the canons. Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 
F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 97. Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 711–12 (E.D. 
Ky. 2004). 
 98. N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1044–45 (D.N.D. 
2005). 
 99. Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 100. TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (2006). 
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would need to meet the strict scrutiny requirements of White.101 
Based on this reasoning, “it would appear that elected judges are 
always campaigning,” and that it is “unlikely that sitting judges 
could ever be subjected to speech restrictions of any sort.”102 
2. States voluntarily over-amend codes 
Court challenges are not the only threat to speech restrictions; 
states have also “reformed” their canons to conform with White’s 
reasoning.103 Most drastically, North Carolina eliminated nearly all 
restrictions on judicial free speech. The canon, which once read, “A 
judge should refrain from political activity inappropriate to his 
judicial office,” now reads, “A judge may engage in political activity 
consistent with his status as a public official.”104 Judicial elections in 
North Carolina now have few, if any, limits on judicial candidate 
speech. While nowhere as extreme as North Carolina, Georgia also 
amended its canons, dropping the pledge or promise clause.105 
“More states are likely to consider changes, some in a good-faith 
effort to comply with White, others in a cynical attempt to exploit 
White by pushing through unnecessarily broad revisions.”106 
3. Unsolved problems 
Based on these trends, it appears that the future of judicial 
speech restrictions is in jeopardy, if not “overwhelmingly doomed to 
failure.”107 Courts and states appear to think that if White found 
announce clauses unconstitutional, other state restrictions on judicial 
campaign speech—anything from fraudulent or misleading speech to 
solicitation of campaign contributions—must be unconstitutional as 
well.108 Most likely, states will continue to deregulate judicial 
 
 101. Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 558. 
 102. Steven Lubet, Judicial Campaign Speech and the Third Law of Motion, 22 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 425, 432–33 (2008). 
 103. See J.J. Gass, After White: Defending and Amending Canons of Judicial Ethics, in 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE SERIES 4 (2004), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/ 
0b74af850b81d92928_bvm6y5sdf.pdf. 
 104. Id. (citing N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (2003)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Nat Stern, The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 38 
SETON HALL L. REV. 63, 65 (2008). 
 108. See supra notes 92–93. 
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campaign speech and courts will persist on invalidation of speech 
restrictions.109 This places states in the same quandary faced by 
nineteenth-century progressives: how can a state protect the 
impartiality of the judicial branch in the face of zero-sum judicial 
elections? 
To compound the problem, several trends threaten the judiciary 
now more than ever. Political parties and special interests are 
investing more money and resources into judicial elections.110 With 
weakened judicial codes of conduct, interest groups are seeking pre-
election commitments from judicial candidates. Additionally, both 
the general public and judges themselves are increasingly criticizing 
the judiciary, whether elected or appointed.111 In total, these acts are 
creating a significant threat to judicial independence and the 
appearance of impartiality right at the time when states are most 
unsure of how to combat the problem. Without confidence in the 
constitutionality of speech restrictions, state supreme courts and 
judicial ethics committees throughout the country are uncertain how 
to limit the negative effects of judicial elections while still holding 
judges accountable to the electorate. 
III. RECUSAL REFORM AS THE SOLUTION 
A solution to the problem of zero-sum judicial elections lies 
dormant in each state’s judicial rules. States need not overhaul their 
codes of judicial conduct or wait for the courts to decide the 
constitutionality of every speech restriction. Three reforms to states’ 
recusal standards would give states the ability to protect impartiality 
and due process in an efficient, constitutional manner. By adopting a 
new model recusal provision, assigning recusal motions to other 
judges, and lessening the financial burden of litigants, states can stop 
 
 109. Developments in the Law, Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1143 
(2006). 
 110. Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice for Sale, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25. For 
example, four candidates for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court raised over $5.4 million in 2007. 
In total, fourteen states have broken fundraising records since 2004. Id. 
 111. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 
2006, at A25 (“Directing anger toward judges enjoys a long—if not exactly venerable—
tradition in our nation. . . . But while scorn for certain judges is not an altogether new 
phenomenon, the breadth and intensity of rage currently being leveled at the judiciary may be 
unmatched in American history.”). O’Connor also notes that “[t]roublingly, attacks on the 
judiciary are now being launched by judges themselves.” Id. 
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the threat that judicial elections pose to the judiciary’s impartiality 
without restricting judicial speech. 
A. Why Recusal Standards Currently Do Not Work 
Recusal is the removal of a judge from presiding over a particular 
case because of a conflict of interest.112 A tool “as old as the history 
of courts,”113 recusal standards have been gradually expanded by 
states since adoption from British common law.114 Recusal provisions 
vary from state to state and are a mix of constitutional, statutory, and 
judicially created standards. Forty-seven states base their provisions 
on the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
which generally states that a judge “shall disqualify himself or herself 
in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”115 In addition to this general reasonableness standard, 
the Model Code urges states to adopt a specific provision for recusal 
based on previous speech—recusal is mandated when a judge or 
judicial candidate has made a public statement that commits or 
appears to commit the judge to a particular result.116 Yet only eleven 
 
 112. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1025 (7th ed. 1999). While there is a technical 
difference between “recusal” and “disqualification,” the two terms are used interchangeably in 
this Comment, the difference between the two being of little practical significance. 
 113. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION § 1.2 (2d ed. 2007). 
 114. Id. Under the common law, a judge was not required to recuse himself for judicial 
bias; only when the judge had a pecuniary interest in the case was recusal mandated. According 
to Sir William Blackstone, “the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, 
who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon 
that presumption and idea.” Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986) (quoting 3 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361). In 1792, the United States Congress 
similarly required federal district judges to recuse themselves when they had an interest in the 
suit. Congress expanded this standard in 1821 to require recusal when the judge had any 
“judicial relationship or connection with a party that would in the judge’s opinion make it 
improper to sit.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544 (1994). Finally, in 1911 federal 
district judges were required by law to recuse themselves for having a general bias toward the 
case. “[V]irtually every commentator who has critically analyzed the subject of judicial 
qualification has applauded its expansion.” FLAMM, supra note 113, § 1.4; see also John 
Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judicial Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 248 
(1987) (explaining the approval of expansion as “a shift in society’s view of judicial psychology, 
and of psychology in general, from the Eighteenth Century’s economic man, susceptible only 
to the tug of financial interest, to today’s Freudian person, awash in a sea of conscious and 
unconscious motives”). 
 115. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 2.11 (2007). 
 116. Id. 
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states include this “public statement” provision in their codes of 
judicial conduct.117 
Recusal may occur in two ways. First, the judge may decide sua 
sponte to withdraw from a case because of a disqualifying 
condition.118 Alternatively, parties may file a motion to disqualify the 
judge, based on either the judge’s own disclosure or the parties’ 
independent knowledge.119 In most states, the judge hearing the case 
will decide the motion requesting recusal. Thus, in both methods 
the system depends heavily on self-recusal by the judge. 
This structural emphasis on judicial self-recusal creates a major 
weakness in existing recusal standards—litigants fear judicial 
retribution. Parties may be deterred from asking for a recusal because 
of fear that the request would anger or challenge the honor of the 
judge hearing the case.120 If a judge believes that his honor is being 
challenged, he is more likely to defensively deny the motion. 
“Judges’ natural reactions are to reject having any partiality or 
prejudice.”121 Additionally, the Model Code’s “reasonableness” 
language that most states have adopted is vaguely defined and 
unpredictable in practice. Under the Model Code language, if a 
party requests recusal in a manner that suggests that the judge’s 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,”122 the judge may 
 
 117. Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and Fair Appeals for 
Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 691, 712 (2007). 
Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin have adopted the public statement provision. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 2.11 (2007) (“A judge 
shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”). 
 119. See FLAMM, supra note 113, § 19.9. 
 120. See R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance 
& Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1833–34 
(2005) (“[A]sking a challenged Justice to rule on a motion to recuse puts that Justice in a 
precarious position. . . . [B]ecause a Justice is expected to recuse himself sua sponte if there is a 
reasonable apprehension of bias, a successful motion to recuse requires the Justice to admit 
that he failed in the first instance to adhere to statutory and ethical requirements.”). 
 121. Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping Up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct’s Prohibition of Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of Bias, 19 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 480 (2006) (“At worst, some judges may be angered and deny 
the motion in retribution. Other judges may convince themselves they can rule fairly, unaware 
that the currents of bias often run deep. Either reaction leaves unprotected the due process 
rights of the targets of bias.”). 
 122. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3, R. 3E(1) (1990); see also, e.g., 
United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that the relevant inquiry 
is whether a reasonable person would have a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s 
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deny the motion merely by justifying that such accusations are 
unreasonable. Given the cost and time of litigation, litigants are 
discouraged from spending more money to file a motion and delay a 
potential trial without a predictable result.123 
A general lack of transparency regarding recusal rulings only 
worsens the problem. Recusal is typically a parties-only decision 
closed to the public. Judges frequently take themselves off of cases, 
but few take the time to issue an opinion regarding that decision.124 
Alternatively, judges who decline a recusal motion often write 
extensive opinions explaining their action. Consequently, rather than 
“accurately portraying the full spectrum of judicial disqualification 
decisions,” available opinions instead “reflect ‘an accumulating 
mound’ of reasons for denying disqualification” without providing 
case law to support such action.125 Judges thus can find a panoply of 
reasons for denying a recusal motion.126 
Additionally, appealing the denial of a recusal motion is often a 
fruitless effort regardless of the merits of the case. Appellate judges 
dislike investigating and ruling on the integrity of fellow judges and 
do not look favorably upon litigants who question the integrity of 
the court.127 Appellate courts face overloaded dockets and may take a 
 
impartiality, not whether the judge is in fact impartial); United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 
576 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[I]n determining whether a judge had the duty to disqualify . . . our 
focus must be on the reaction of the reasonable observer.”). 
 123. For a real-life account of an attorney deliberating the pros and cons of filing a 
recusal motion, see generally Christian C. Mester, Rescue in Recusal, TRIAL TECHNIQUES, 
Oct. 2007, at 39. 
 124. James Sample, David Pozen & Michael Young, Fair Courts: Setting Recusal 
Standards (2008), at 32, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/ 
fair_courts_setting_recusal_standards/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2009) (“The failure of many judges 
to explain their recusal decisions, and the lack of a policy forcing them do so, offends not only 
a basic tenet of legal process, but also a basic tenet of liberal democracy—that officials must 
give public reasons for their actions in order for those actions to be legitimate.”). 
 125. FLAMM, supra note 113, § 1.5 (citations omitted). 
 126. While not discussed in this Comment, states have experimented with two solutions 
to solve this transparency issue, both of which fall far short of success. First, Alaska created a 
database that tracks the number of recusals for each judge and is available to all parties. But the 
database does not include the reasons for recusal, and parties must examine the individual case 
files for the reasons, if they were ever recorded in such files in the first place. See Sample, Pozen 
& Young, supra note 124, at 32. Second, California requires that parties receive a copy of any 
written answer a judge files regarding disqualification. But still no requirement exists requiring 
judges to explain the reasons for their decision in such a filing. See id. at 33. 
 127. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acq’n Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864–65, 865 n.12 (1988) 
(exemplifying the typical attitude of appellate judges regarding recusal motion appeals by 
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conservative approach to recusal appeals to save time and 
resources.128 In reviewing the motion, judges act on a strong 
presumption that the judge is impartial,129 and courts generally hold 
that only the most outrageous behavior will justify overturning a 
recusal denial.130 Consequently, because there is little recourse 
available if a party loses the initial recusal motion, there is even less 
incentive to file the motion. 
B. Realistically Reforming State Recusal Standards 
Strengthening each state’s recusal standards will solve the 
problem of zero-sum judicial elections. The inherent weaknesses of 
existing recusal standards hinder their true purpose—to maintain the 
actuality and appearance of judicial impartiality. Despite Justice 
Kennedy’s implicit endorsement of heightened recusal standards as a 
less restrictive alternative to speech restrictions,131 states have 
“systemically underused and underenforced” recusal provisions to 
alleviate the problems caused by judicial elections.132 This Comment 
offers three reforms that will greatly enhance the effectiveness of any 
state’s recusal standard and will provide a valid alternative to speech 
restrictions as a means of strengthening judicial impartiality. 
1. Promptly adopt the ABA’s “public statement” provision 
States should promptly adopt the Model Code’s “public 
statement” provision. The 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
specifically calls for recusal based on certain instances of judicial 
speech. The clause states: 
 
stating that “people who have not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge 
suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges”). 
 128. John D. Feerick, Disqualification of Judges (The Sarokin Matter): Is it a Threat to 
Judicial Independence?, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (1993) (“Conservatism in recusal is 
particularly required today when federal dockets are overloaded with cases brought under an 
ever growing federal criminal code.”). 
 129. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s 
Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 70 (2000) 
(citations and quotations omitted). A typical view of the presumptuous appellate judge is that 
“a judge would not undertake to preside over a case where his or her impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.” Id. 
 130. Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1079–81 (1996). 
 131. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 132. Sample, Pozen & Young, supra note 124, at 20. 
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A judge shall disqualify himself or herself . . . [when] the judge, 
while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, 
other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that 
commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result 
or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.133 
The authors of the provision designed this section “to make the 
disqualification ramifications of prohibited speech violations 
explicit.”134 
Adopting the public statement provision addresses two of the 
weaknesses inherent in current recusal standards by making the 
analysis of such motions more predictable. First, by creating explicit 
consequences for judicial speech, the analysis for such motions will 
focus more on the actual speech that caused the appearance of 
impartiality and less on the judge’s reasonableness or character. 
Litigants can then more accurately predict how a judge would rule 
on a recusal motion by examining the efficacy of the public 
statement the judge made, rather than forecasting whether the judge 
would agree with a capricious reasonableness argument. A more 
definite standard creates less reliance on self-recusal. Second, 
appellate judges find recusal motion appeals less complicated when 
provided with a substantive definition. With a more precise standard 
in hand, appellate judges will find the appeal of their colleagues’ 
decisions less repugnant. Explicit standards create a less 
confrontational situation when overturning a decision. 
Critics argue that such a provision would chill speech just as 
much as actual speech restrictions do.135 If, due to mandatory 
recusals, judges are unable to hear the very cases they feel most 
passionately about, they will be discouraged from declaring such 
issues in the election. This argument exemplifies the collision that 
occurs between free speech and judicial impartiality—there cannot be 
two winners in zero-sum judicial elections. The strength in using 
recusal reform is not that it solves this tension, but that it allows 
 
 133. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(5) (2007). 
 134. Matthew D. Besser, May I Be Recused? The Tension Between Judicial Campaign 
Speech and Recusal After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197, 
1216 n.115 (2003). 
 135. See Dimino, supra note 11, at 331 n.208 (“Though recusal appears superficially to 
eliminate bias, its effect is to abridge the same free speech rights that are abridged through a 
speech ban. If judges may discuss cases and voters contribute funds and resources only if the 
judge they support will be disqualified from hearing cases on the relevant subjects, there is 
actually a disincentive to speak.”); see also id. at 343 n.267. 
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states to choose judicial impartiality over free speech in a 
constitutional manner—a solution that speech restrictions currently 
fail to accomplish. States can then decide for themselves with which 
side of the sum-zero debate they wish to align. Additionally, the 
public statement provision is a practical reform that still allows 
candidates to give signals of judicial philosophy without declaring 
specific positions. In short, the public statement provision 
discourages exactly the speech worth discouraging. 
a. The constitutionality of strengthened recusal standards. Recusal 
standards that include the public statement provision survive 
constitutional scrutiny.136 Unlike speech restrictions, recusal policies 
only incidentally burden campaign speech. While the public 
statement provision refers to the type of speech that triggers recusal, 
the provision does not directly limit speech—judges are free to say 
whatever they please. Government action which does not facially 
regulate protected speech is subject to a different standard than are 
restrictions which directly burden speech.137 The standard for such 
“incidental burdens” is similar to intermediate scrutiny, in part 
because otherwise nearly every government action would burden 
some fundamental right.138 Strict scrutiny does not apply. Rather, 
these incidental burdens on speech must meet the Supreme Court’s 
O’Brien test: (1) the regulation must be “within the constitutional 
power of the Government”; (2) it must further “an important or 
substantial governmental interest”; (3) such an interest must be 
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression”; and (4) “the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must 
be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”139 
 
 136. See the following for examples of recusal standards that survived strict scrutiny: Kan. 
Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1234 (D. Kan. 2006) (“[The] recusal Canon is 
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of judicial impartiality and the 
appearance of impartiality.”); Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. 
Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (D. Alaska 2005), vacated in part, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007); N.D. 
Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1044 (D.N.D. 2005) (“The recusal 
provisions in Canon 3E(1) serve the state’s interest in impartiality and the canon is narrowly 
drafted to achieve that interest.”). 
 137. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–78 (1968). 
 138. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1175, 1178 (1996) (“The doctrinal distinction between direct and incidental burdens rests 
partly on a floodgates concern. Nearly every law will, in some circumstances, impose an 
incidental burden on some right.”). 
 139. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
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The first prong of the O’Brien test is easily met: states clearly 
hold the constitutional power to create their own recusal standards. 
While litigants do not possess a formal right to disqualify a judge, the 
Due Process Clause gives litigants the right to an impartial trial—
litigants thus have an implied right to disqualify an impartial judge.140 
But recusal motions based on due process grounds are rare, in part 
because federal and state legislatures are free to impose their own 
recusal standards.141 In fact, states are free to impose recusal 
standards that exceed those mandated by the Due Process Clause,142 
and most states have chosen to do so.143 
Likewise, recusal standards easily pass the third prong of the 
O’Brien test which requires that the challenged regulation be 
content-neutral. Because incidental burdens are inherently content-
neutral and thus by definition do not facially restrict speech, recusal 
provisions pass the third prong.144 “[W]hether a statute is content 
neutral or content based is something that can be determined on the 
face of it . . . .”145 Recusal provisions do not facially restrict speech 
and thus pass the third prong. 
The other two prongs can be “distilled” into a test similar to 
intermediate scrutiny: the regulation must be narrowly tailored to 
further a substantial government interest.146 This version of “narrow 
tailoring” is considerably less demanding than its strict scrutiny 
counterpart. Rather than the “least restrictive means” to achieving 
that interest, the narrow tailoring of O’Brien simply requires that no 
alternative “serv[e] the state’s interest as efficiently as it is served by 
 
  
 
 140. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1972); Berger v. United States, 255 
U.S. 22, 35–36 (1921). 
 141. FLAMM, supra note 113, § 2.5.2. 
 142. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (mentioning that states have the ability to “adopt recusal standards more rigorous 
than due process requires, and censure judges who violate [those] standards”). 
 143. FLAMM, supra note 112, § 2.5.2. 
 144. Dorf, supra note 138, at 1202 (“Prong three merely restates the proposition that 
the challenged regulation must be content-neutral—which is a precondition for the application 
of the test in the first instance.”). 
 145. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
 146. Dorf, supra note 138, at 1202–03. 
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the regulation under attack.”147 “This approach amounts to no more 
than a prohibition on gratuitous inhibition of expression.”148 
The Model Code’s public statement provision meets this test. 
The public statement provision, and recusal standards in general, 
further a substantial governmental interest—judicial impartiality 
through party neutrality. Recusal provisions “guarantee to litigants 
that the judge will apply the law to them in the same way” as anyone 
else149—classic party neutrality. Recusal does not occur until an 
actual issue is before a judge. This limits the effect of the provision to 
specific parties in specific hearings and avoids the issue-neutrality that 
Justice Scalia so forcefully rejected.150 Party neutrality comprises the 
foundation of judicial impartiality, and the public statement 
provision ensures that judges who commit, or appear to commit, to a 
particular result before hearing the case will not preside over such 
cases. Likewise, the public statement provision meets the narrow 
tailoring requirement. A judge may speak out during elections, and 
whatever speech is not attached to an eventual case is not 
unnecessarily hindered.151 
b. The practicality of strengthened recusal standards. On a 
practical note, adopting the public statement provision provides the 
proper policy balance between free speech and due process. First, if a 
judge feels so strongly about an issue that she declares her views 
openly and clamors for the opportunity to sit on such a case, the 
impartiality of the judge is put in question regarding that issue and 
for appearance’s sake the judge should not hear the case. Judges have 
a First Amendment right to speak their views freely, not a right to 
preside over whichever cases they desire.  
 
 147. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the 
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 
1484–85 (1975)); see also id. at 1202–03 n.113; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
797–98 (1989). 
 148. Dorf, supra note 138, at 1203 (citation and quotation omitted). 
 149. Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1234 (D. Kan. 2006). 
 150. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–76 (2002). 
 151. Conversely, the public statement provision is also sufficiently broad to cover a 
substantial amount of the causes of electoral pressure. The White majority found that 
Minnesota’s announce clause failed the narrowly tailored test in part by being limited only to a 
candidate’s campaign speech, such an “infinitesimal” portion of the judge’s statements that 
could create pressure to rule in a certain way. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. By not 
limiting the effects of recusal to campaign speech, but rather applying to any “public 
statement” made while a judge or judicial candidate, the public statement provision avoids this 
pitfall as well. 
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The public statement provision, while discouraging such outright 
policy declarations, does not hinder broad statements detailing 
judicial philosophy. For example, judges may still describe 
themselves as conservatives, liberals, strict constructionists, or 
believers in the living Constitution without any fear of 
disqualification from future cases. General declarations would be 
invaluable to inform the electorate without requiring promises of 
future rulings. 
Furthermore, adopting the public statement provision caters to 
the “overwhelming majority” of judges who do not want to 
announce their legal views.152 These candidates would be given a 
valid rationale for maintaining their appearance of impartiality 
without appearing evasive of the issues. 
2. Assign recusal motions to other judges 
The public statement provision alone will not purge the courts of 
all the weaknesses inherent to existing recusal standards. If states 
adopted the public statement provision but made no other changes, 
the judge whose recusal the litigants seek would still make the final 
decision regarding the motion, and litigants would continue to fear 
judicial retribution after denied recusal motions. Furthermore, 
judges would still bristle at the accusation that their campaign speech 
was in some way improper, even if a more defined recusal provision 
existed. This is especially true when the issues at bar involve topics 
that judges feel passionately enough about to include in their 
campaign speech.153 
States could solve this problem by following the example of a 
handful of states and arranging for other judges to hear recusal 
motions.154 Under this scenario, a litigant would file a motion with 
 
 152. Professor Roy Schotland explains:  
[A strengthened recusal standard] supports the overwhelming majority of candidates 
who want to campaign judiciously—they will be able to say “I know what you 
would like me to say, but if I go into that then I will be unable to sit in just the cases 
you care about most.” 
Schotland, supra note 22, at 1102. The judge can send signals to the electorate and not thwart 
the purpose of judicial elections, while still maintaining the appearance of impartiality. 
 153. See Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the 
Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 615 (2004) (“[T]hose might 
be precisely the issues they care about most.”). 
 154. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.3(c) (2005); TEX. R. CIV. PROC. 18a(c) 
(2007). 
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the judge of whom disqualification is requested. Rather than 
deciding the motion herself, the motion would be sent to another 
judge to decide on the merits. This simple procedure would both 
lessen litigants’ fears of judicial retribution and improve the fairness 
of rulings by relying less on self-recusal. Furthermore, the natural 
reaction to reject any accusation of partiality in oneself does not exist 
when another judge is viewing the matter. While what one may call a 
“black wall of silence” might still exist, this surely would be a less 
partial method than judges hearing their own recusal motions. At the 
very least, the appearance of impartiality would improve and public 
opinion would increase. 
The most obvious critique of this reform is the significant costs 
to the courts that “arise from the shuffling of such cases between 
judges and from the effort required” to rule on such motions.155 
While such shuffling could be an administrative challenge, the 
alternative of holding a litigant’s right to an impartial tribunal 
“hostage to the ‘efficiency’ of allowing biased judges to decide cases” 
would break the law’s promise of neutrality.156 Although cost is a 
legitimate concern of the judiciary, the public statement provision 
would not make the standard for recusal so low that every party 
would be seeking to have their judge recused. Because litigants 
would still face a sizable burden in winning such a motion, recusal 
motions would not likely be used frivolously.157 The appearance of 
impartiality and increase in public trust is worth the cost that the 
reform might entail.158 
3. Lessen the financial burden of filing motions 
While adopting the public statement provision and assigning 
recusal motions to other judges would alleviate fears of retribution 
 
 155. Shepard, supra note 130, at 1081; see also Pearson, supra note 120, at 1833 (“The 
single-judge procedure . . . enhances judicial efficiency . . . .”). 
 156. Donald L. Burnett, Jr., A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault upon Impartiality of 
State Courts and the Challenge to Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 265, 289 (2007). 
 157. In fact, having a predictable, defined standard could even lower the number of 
parties that seek recusal—expensive “fishing expeditions” are less likely when a party knows its 
chances of success. 
 158. Other critics claim that the original judge has the “best knowledge of the facts.” 
Pearson, supra note 120, at 1833. Yet, while the challenged judge may be the most familiar 
with the facts, “the very biases or conflicts of interest that prompted the challenge in the first 
place may prevent her from fairly evaluating the import of those facts.” Sample, Pozen & 
Young, supra note 124, at 32. 
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and predictability problems, litigants would still be left with one 
glaring obstacle—the immense costs involved in litigating such a 
motion. Parties already face daunting legal bills to simply prepare for 
trial. To require more hours to research all of a judge’s public speech 
would be tremendously burdensome, if not impossible. States can 
address this issue through speech disclosure requirements or 
peremptory recusal policies. 
a. Strengthen judicial speech disclosure requirements. States should 
require judges to disclose their campaign and other public speech.159 
For example, states could mandate that judges file transcripts or 
copies of all speeches, advertising, and campaign materials. Such 
filing could then be made available to parties for inspection. While 
such a policy appears to shift the costs from litigants to the state, 
most judges already have an ethical obligation to disclose possible 
grounds for recusal.160 The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
which many states have followed, declares that judges “should 
disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties 
or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible 
motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no 
basis for disqualification.”161 By requiring the judges to disclose their 
public statements in advance, the state would require what should 
eventually be made known to parties anyway.162 A judge’s privacy or 
other constitutional rights would not be threatened since the 
disclosed statements would have been made in public and would 
presumably already be available. 
Mandatory disclosure would strengthen a currently ineffective 
method of disclosing past speech. Several states currently require 
disclosure at the time of possible disqualification. Florida, for 
example, requires judges to “disclose on the record information that 
the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant 
to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is 
 
 159. Sample, Pozen & Young, supra note 124, at 27–28. 
 160. See FLAMM, supra note 113, § 19.10.2. 
 161. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11, cmt. 5 (2007); see also Sample, 
Pozen & Young, supra note 124, at 28 n.101 (“Notice, however, that this stipulation appears 
only in the Commentary and is phrased in hortatory, not mandatory terms. Legally, litigants 
cannot require an unwilling judge to disclose facts and opinions.” (internal citation and 
quotation omitted)). 
 162. The main criticism of this policy would again be the financial burden on courts. For 
a response to such criticism, see supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text. 
STOTT.PP3 3/13/2009 9:16 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
510 
no real basis for disqualification.”163 Other states merely encourage 
such disclosure.164 This takes a step toward informing parties of 
relevant disclosures and “increases the reputational and professional 
cost to judges who fail to disclose pertinent information that later 
emerges through another source.”165 But such procedures still rely 
heavily on the judge’s own honesty and forthrightness, and the 
frankest of admissions are seldom disclosed.166 Whether because 
judges assume such speech lacks relevance or are not willing to bear 
such costs, past speech is rarely included in such disclosure. 
Requiring disclosure of all public speech beforehand avoids the self-
recusal problems that weaken current recusal standards. 
b. Peremptory recusals. Alternatively, states could allow each party 
one peremptory recusal at the beginning of trial to lessen the 
financial burden of filing motions. A minority of states have adopted 
rules permitting litigants to seek recusal of a judge on a peremptory 
basis.167 Litigants may strike one judge per proceeding without a 
showing of unfairness or actual bias.168 Peremptory recusals would 
negate some of the costs inherent in assigning recusal motions to 
other judges. Litigants who in good faith believe their assigned judge 
is partial could secure an unbiased judge without the cost and risk of 
filing a recusal motion. 
The main argument against peremptory recusal is fear of 
misuse—that litigants will strike judges without any due process 
cause, and will thereby create delay and administrative burdens.169 
But procedural safeguards could limit such concerns. States could 
allow only one peremptory recusal and require its use early in the 
proceeding. Likewise, some states require the party seeking recusal to 
show grounds of prejudice or submit an affidavit swearing to a belief 
 
 163. FLA. STAT. ANN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (2000); see also In 
re Frank, 753 So. 2d 1228, 1239 (Fla. 2000). 
 164. See, e.g., MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 3(C) (2007). 
 165. Sample, Pozen & Young, supra note 124, at 28. 
 166. Id. (“For example, no one will say, ‘I am a racist’ or ‘I feel beholden to the trial 
lawyers who supported my campaign.’”). 
 167. FLAMM, supra note 113, § 3.1. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1254 (2002) (“Opponents of peremptory challenge proposals historically 
have raised three primary concerns: (1) judge-shopping, (2) delay, and (3) administrative 
concerns.”). 
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of prejudice.170 Procedural restraints such as these would omit truly 
ungrounded claims. As with mandatory disclosure, peremptory 
recusals would significantly lessen the financial burden on litigants. 
C. Applying the Proposed Reforms 
To demonstrate how these recusal reforms would operate in 
practice, consider how they would apply to the example of Justice 
Louis Butler given in the introduction. Recall that while 
campaigning for a seat on the bench, Justice Butler spoke at a 
fundraiser for a gay-rights group, gained the group’s endorsement, 
raised funds for the group, and received complimentary press for the 
event.171 Once on the bench, a minister brought a defamation suit 
against the gay-rights group. 
Assume that Justice Butler presides in a state that has adopted all 
of the recusal reforms recommended above. The state has adopted 
the public statement provision, created a procedure for other judges 
to hear recusal motions, and enacted judicial speech disclosure 
requirements and peremptory recusal policies. Such a state would 
not have to rely on speech restrictions to assure judicial impartiality. 
Because the state does not rely on speech restrictions, Justice 
Butler has the ability to speak on whatever he chooses. His 
constitutional rights to express his views during the campaign are not 
hindered, including his position regarding gay rights. However, the 
recusal standards provide a disincentive for outright policy 
declarations. It is more likely that Justice Butler would instead send 
signals to the group through discussing overall judicial philosophy. 
By not hindering his speech during the election through speech 
restrictions, the electorate would hear his expression and make an 
accurate, informed decision when voting. If Butler loses the election, 
it would not be because speech restrictions have needlessly limited 
his speech. By seeing any potential “crocodiles in calm waters,” the 
electorate would choose a judge who best represents their values. 
If Justice Butler still chose to speak on his position regarding gay 
rights, the recusal reforms would then protect judicial impartiality. If 
elected, Justice Butler would provide disclosure of all public 
speeches, advertisements, and campaign materials, including his 
remarks to the gay-rights group, which the state would then make 
 
 170. FLAMM, supra note 113, § 3.8. 
 171. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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publicly available. As the minister suing the gay-rights group appears 
before Justice Butler, the judge would have the opportunity to 
recuse himself from the case. If Butler were to not self-recuse, the 
minister could then view the text of the speech by accessing the 
public database. The burden would be on the litigant minister to file 
a motion for recusal that cites specific speech demonstrating how 
Justice Butler committed himself to a particular result in the case. 
This motion would not go to Butler himself but rather to another 
judge to decide on the merits. If that judge were to find the motion 
meritless, the minister would not be left to face the potential judicial 
retribution of Justice Butler. The minister could still use a 
peremptory recusal motion to be assigned to another judge. Each of 
these procedural reforms would guard the appearance of judicial 
impartiality while still protecting free speech and due process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The predicament that states place themselves in when they hold 
judicial elections presents a serious threat to judicial independence 
and impartiality. This is especially true in an era of greater special 
interest and political influence, weakened ethical codes of conduct, 
and anger towards the judiciary in general. The creation of judicial 
elections forced states to choose between judicial free speech and 
accurate elections or judicial impartiality and due process in a zero-
sum game. States have traditionally sided with impartiality and due 
process by restricting the speech of judicial candidates. 
Now that speech restrictions appear constitutionally doomed for 
defeat, states that desire judicial impartiality should adopt strong 
recusal provisions. The vast majority of states have inadequate recusal 
policies to combat the threats to judicial impartiality. Such states 
should promptly adopt the ABA public statement provision, provide 
a procedure for other judges to hear recusal motions, and lessen the 
financial burden of filing such motions. These three reforms would 
greatly increase any state’s public confidence in their judiciary, and 
provide an efficient, constitutional way of alleviating the ills of 
judicial elections.  
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